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Introduction
The present issue is dedicated to the Philosophy of Art conference that 
has been taking place annually at the Interuniversity Centre Dubrovnik 
since 2012. Initiated by David Davies, a McGill based philosopher 
whose ties to the region and to the IUC have been fi rmly established 
via his role as one of directors of Philosophy of Science conference, the 
Philosophy of Art brings together philosophers of art and aestheticians 
from Europe and North America, mostly but not exclusively of analytic 
bent. This is the fi rst issue of any journal dedicated entirely to this con-
ference, and it is the fi rst time that Croatian Journal of Philosophy has 
opened itself fully to papers dealing with art and art-related issues. It is 
our hope that many more are coming. 
David Davies in his “Making Sense of Popular Art” engages with 
Noel Carroll’s account of mass art, by raising the question of whether 
some or all works of ‘mass art’ in Carroll’s sense are rightly thought of as 
works of mass art, rather than as non-artistic mass artifacts. As Davies 
argues, there isn’t a prior conception of what it is for something to be an 
artwork which allows us to take some things satisfying this conception 
to have the further property of being ‘popular’. Therefore, what we need 
is a way of distinguishing different senses in which artworks might be 
described as ‘popular’, and, different senses in which artifacts might 
be described as being ‘art’. Davies’ strategy is to bring into a discussion 
what he calls a neo-Goodmanian approach (defended in his forthcom-
ing monograph How artworks work), ultimately claiming that while the 
neo-Goodmanian can embrace artworks that are ‘popular’ in the sense 
of being targeted at a wide audience, she should insist that there cannot 
be artworks that meet all of Carroll’s requirements for being ‘mass art’.
In his contribution, “Aesthetic and Artistic Verdicts” James R. Ham-
ilton calls for a distinction between the two kinds of verdicts. As he ar-
gues, aesthetic verdicts are refl ections of the kinds of things we prefer 
and take pleasure in while artistic are refl ections of other judgments we 
make about the kinds of achievements that are made in works of art. He 
defends an ‘achievement model’, as an alternative to the ‘ideal critics’ 
model and to the model that appeals to our preferences regarding works 
of art. His account is bolstered by theoretical discussions on what counts 
as an achievement developed in literature on well-being. 
Stephen Snyder, in his “Artistic Conversations: Artworks and Per-
sonhood” engages with Arthur Danto’s account of the human person and 
the notion of embodied meaning employed in Danto’s defi nition of the 
artwork. Central is the claim that the “artworld” itself manifests prop-
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erties that are an imprint of the historical representation of the “world” 
which is implicitly embodied in the artist’s style. The “world” that is 
stamped on the people of a historical period entails a point of view, simi-
larly to the logic that guides a conversation. This “conversational” logic 
is also extant in the artworks that artists of a given period create. On 
Snyder’ s view, this analysis of Danto’s account of how people are con-
nected to their world clarifi es Danto’s assertions of a parallel structure 
of personifi cation in the artwork and the human, and his claims that 
artworks themselves appear to be in a kind of dialogue.
In “Art History without Theory: A Case Study in 20th Century Schol-
arship” Deodáth Zuh discusses the case study from 1950s Hungary, 
centered on Lajos Fülep’s review on the doctoral thesis of Hungarian 
Renaissance scholar, Jolán Balogh. This case is an initiative to refl ect on 
the status of research programmes in art historical practice. Zuh aims 
to show that art history’s need for theory remains relevant as the process 
of research advances, and to argue that a ‘theory-unaware’ history of art 
would fail to reconstruct how different art-making individuals conceived 
of aesthetic properties. As he argues, the work of an art historian who 
does not pursue a research programme might lack coherence and reso-
nance. Further issues raised in this contribution relate to the question of 
whether in the case of art, internal-normative history is governed by the 
problem of aesthetic value and whether the external-empirical history 
could be only formulated in these terms. 
David Collins’s contribution, “Aesthetic Possibilities of Cinematic 
Improvisation” targets the scepticism regarding the artistic potential or 
the possibility of fi lms being improvised artworks. Collins argues that it 
is conceptually possible for many elements of the fi lmmaking process to 
be performed in an improvisatory manner, and shows how a number of 
existing fi lms and fi lmmaking practices provide examples of the realiza-
tion of such possibilities. He analyzes these fi lms and takes them to show 
that improvisation by fi lmmakers can enhance the aesthetic or artistic 
value of a fi lm, including their artistic potential. In addition, Collins 
considers several social and ethical implications of improvisatory ap-
proaches to fi lmmaking, and to art in general.
Adam Anderzeyewski unites theoretical discussions of crime genre 
with the aesthetics of food in his contribution “Tasting the Truth: The 
Role of Food and Gustatory Knowledge in Hannibal”. The essay is a 
detailed and meticulous analysis of the famous television series, which 
Anderzeyewski uses to develop an alternative model to classical episte-
mology of detective fi ction cantered on vision and deduction. This new 
model is built upon gustatory knowledge that takes the central stage in 
the world orchestrated by Dr. Lector. 
James O. Young’s paper “Literary Fiction and the Cultivation of Vir-
tue” brings together theoretical presuppositions of some philosophers, the 
view that engagements with literature can make people more virtuous, 
and some most recent empirical fi ndings supporting this view. Three 
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claims in particular are discussed: entering imaginatively into the lives 
of the fi ctional characters increases empathy; reading literary fi ction 
promotes self-refl ection; and readers mimic the prosocial behaviour of 
fi ctional characters. However, as Young argues in the second part, there 
is no guarantee that in reading literary fi ction, readers will not mimic 
antisocial behaviour and thus become morally corrupted. 
Britt Harrison, in her contribution, “Introducing Cinematic Human-
ism: A Solution to the Problem of Cinematic Cognitivism” develops an 
approach to fi lm she calls ‘philosophy of fi lm without theory’. Harrison’s 
aims are twofold: fi rst, to develop a ‘cinematic humanism’, an approach 
to fi lm that emphasizes its capacity to illuminate the human condition; 
and second, to show that such an approach cannot be defended within 
what traditionally seems its natural framework, namely cinematic cog-
nitivism. The focus of Harrison’s contribution is a historical reconstruc-
tion of the notion of cognitive, for which the author claims has become 
ambiguous and theory-laden, mostly due to Noam Chomsky’s work. Con-
sequently, to appeal to anything cognitive in our research program is 
problematic.  
An alternative way of thinking about narrative art’s capacity to shed 
light on the human condition is presented in the fi nal contribution. Iris 
Vidmar, in her “Literature and truth – revisiting Stolnitz’s anti-cognitiv-
ism” defends a theoretical account of literary cognitivism, a view accord-
ing to which literature is cognitively valuable. Vidmar addresses Stol-
nitz’s famous article “On the Cognitive Triviality of Art”, countering its 
claims by fi ndings from contemporary epistemology. Vidmar argues that 
testimony is the underlying mechanism via which the cognitive transfer 
between literary works and readers take place, and goes on to show that 
contemporary epistemology is more embracive of the cognitive values tra-
ditionally awarded to literature.
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